Death by suicide: H5N1 research raises question of censorship

Consider this for the plot setup of a Hollywood thriller: Leading virologists genetically engineer and mutate a Biosafety-Level 3 virus, rendering it dangerous enough to rapidly infect and prove the mortality of a fraction of the world's population.
Perhaps you're saying you've heard this one before, but I'm not referring to Danny Boyle's 28 Days Later nor Stephen King's The Stand; I'm referring to a clear and present threat affecting all of us today.
Last November, Ron Fouchier and his team at Erasmus University in Rotterdam, Holland, engineered a new, mutant strain of lethal HPAI A (H5N1) - ?commonly known as "bird flu" - and intended to disseminate the details of the research. By all indications, this mutated strain is as contagious among humans as the common flu in that coughs and sneezes would be sufficient mediums for transmission from one carrier to a reservoir of potential hosts.
To make matters bleaker than they already are, a look at the mortality rate of this virulent strain is simply frightening. As reported by the World Health Organization, records indicate that 345 of the 584 H5N1-contracted human victims have died; do the math and that yields a chilling fatality rate close to 60%. To put things in perspective, the 1918 influenza pandemic, one of the deadliest natural disasters in human history, exhibited a comparatively meager 2.5% mortality rate. The sole reason why H5N1 found in nature hasn't become a pandemic killer comparable to this 1918 influenza is because prior to Fouchier's research, H5N1 had been genetically incapable of human-to-human transmission, and despite its high mutation rate typical of RNA viruses, it had yet to evolve and find the necessary mutations to become "airborne." Following Fouchier's discovery, however, this all changed.
This raises the question: how will the research's findings be harnessed to benefit public health as well as future research in influenza, when the finding itself is a threat to humanity? According to the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), it's a threat all too great to overlook. The board has since halted its publication for widespread dissemination. Officials of NSABB and fellow proponents of this "censorship" based their argument on the dangers associated with nefarious uses of the research findings, given that details could become a "recipe" for biological weapons desired by terrorists, belligerent states, or rogue actors. Moreover, biosecurity experts have constantly brought to attention the possibility of an accidental release by a laboratory with poor biosecurity measures.
Though the NSABB brings to light many legitimate concerns for the sake of public safety, and I commend the organization for their vigilance in the science community, I find their decision to urge censorship a misguided and mistaken one.
Sure, worst-case scenario, Fouchier's research could bring about deleterious consequences that could theoretically wipe a fraction of the human population from the face of the planet. But it's important to see this possibility within appropriate proportions and recognize the other side of the spectrum.
Foremost, I strongly agree with Dr. Schaffner, Chairman of Preventive Medicine at Vanderbilt, who reasons that the "biowarfare threat of influenza is very low." Not only is the spread of H5N1 impossible to control with the advanced transportation systems of modern society, but if terrorists indeed tried to engineer mutations in the H5N1 virus, they would be diverting a lot of resources away from developing proven weapons that are far more effective at targeting specific populations. Therefore, pursuing an H5N1-based biological weapon is just against all logic, and publication would have little if any effect on non-state actors, because the idea simply goes against cost-effectiveness.
The other source of misguidance that led to the NSABB's poor decision is their disregard for the fact that H5N1 has a naturally high mutation rate. Wild H5N1 found in nature is only one step away from Fouchier's man-made mutation, and if circumstances permit, there exists a probability that the virus will mutate without human intervention. It's thus critical to understand that an outbreak could be brought about by nature-an occurrence that offers no warning signals. The preventive measure that should be taken is this: publish Fouchier's project and immediately push research efforts for a vaccine. By doing so, valuable knowledge for the development of a vaccine for H5N1 from that point onward would be freely shared, maximizing efficiency and allowing the consolidation of priceless knowledge from the brightest scientists around the world.
Another problem inherent in the NSABB's decision to advise censorship is that they are late. There's an interesting phenomenon called the Streisand effect, in which an attempt to hide information actually publicizes the information more widely. Immediately following the initial reports of this mutated virus, the media stormed in and have since blown the situation out of proportion. Already, thousands of scientists have examined Fouchier's project in its entirety, and a Japanese laboratory retrieved similar results to that of Fouchier's. What could possibly halt the spreading now?
The answer is that nothing can stop the spread of Fouchier's research, and nothing should have attempted to stop the spread in the first place. In past centuries, we've seen that advancements in science are most prolific in a free-market atmosphere of ideas where knowledge is shared and information flows freely throughout the science community. I find it crucial to preserve this aspect of science, because the study of science is above all a collaborative process. Now, with the research being redacted and the whole crisis about this contagious virus still up in the air, we can only wait and take a deep breath. But then again, maybe that's not a great idea.